Many have attempted to respond to arguments for the incompatibility of freedom with divine foreknowledge by claiming that God’s beliefs about the future are explained by what the world is like at that future time. We argue that this response adequately advances the discussion only if the theist is able to articulate a model of foreknowledge that is both clearly possible and compatible with freedom. We investigate various models the theist might articulate and argue that all of these models fail.

A paper was published in 2003 discussing the ethics of nurses participating in executions by inserting the intravenous line for lethal injections and providing care until death. This paper was circulated on an international email list of senior nurses and academics to engender discussion. From that discussion, several people agreed to contribute to a paper expressing their own thoughts and feelings about the ethics of nurses participating in executions in countries where capital punishment is legal. While a range of opinions (...) were presented, these opinions fell into two main themes. The first of these included reflections on the philosophical obligations of nurses as caregivers who support those in times of great need, including condemned prisoners at the end of life. The second theme encompassed the notion that no nurse ever should participate in the active taking of life, in line with the codes of ethics of various nursing organisations. This range of opinions suggests the complexity of this issue and the need for further public discussion. (shrink)

Background Disaster scenarios challenge both novice and experienced nurses to navigate complex ethical dilemmas in resource-limited environments. Traditional nursing education often leaves new nurses unprepared for the ethical demands of disaster nursing. Utilitarianism must often guide triage ethics and decision-making. There is a critical need to equip nursing students with these ethical competencies. Research question/Aim This study explores nursing students’ lived experiences using introductory triage ethics in mass casualty incident simulation (MCIS). Research design A qualitative, interpretive phenomenological approach was employed, (...) analyzing reflective journal responses from senior nursing students following MCIS participation. Participants and research context Participants were senior-year nursing students from a private university in the U.S., engaging in MCIS as part of their curriculum, which simulated resource-limited disaster scenarios requiring real-time ethical decisions. Ethical considerations The study received Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, and participants provided informed consent. Data were anonymized and did not affect academic evaluation. Findings Two major themes emerged: 1. Living in Ethical Dilemmas (subthemes: We Could Have Saved Them If…, Looking Past Obvious Suffering, How Can We Be Prepared?, We Can’t Abandon Them). 2. Development of Ethical Competency (subthemes: Knowing You’ve Done Enough, Finding New Perspectives, There Is No Right Answer). Students grew in moral reasoning and emotional resilience, transitioning from patient-centered care to utilitarian decision-making. Conclusions Participation in the mass casualty incident simulation allowed nursing students to confront and navigate complex ethical challenges in real time, fostering significant growth in moral reasoning and emotional resilience. Through immersion in simulated ethical dilemmas, students grappled with the tension between patient-centered care and the realities of utilitarian decision-making. This experience catalyzed a deeper understanding of ethical ambiguity and the development of moral clarity, equipping them with foundational skills for ethically navigating crises. Nursing curricula should recognize and incorporate opportunities that facilitate this ethical growth through experiential learning. (shrink)

Richard Watson maintains that deep ecology suffers from an internal contradiction and should therefore be rejected. Watson contends that deep ecology claims to be non-anthropocentric while at the same time is committed to setting humans apart from nature, which is inherently anthropocentric. I argue that Watson’s objection arises out of a fundamental misunderstanding of how deep ecologist’s conceive of the ‘Self.’ Drawing on resources from Buddhism, I offer an understanding of the ‘Self’ that is fully consistent with (...) deep ecology, and does not lead to the anthropocentric contradiction that Watson identifies. The paper will proceed as follows: First, I articulate Watson’s objection, and briefly discuss the traditional deep ecology position. Next, I turn to a discussion of the ‘Self’ and show that there are conceptions of human nature that are not separate from ‘Nature.’ It will thus be shown that deep ecology is not inconsistent and need not be rejected. (shrink)

This article is the author's response to critical essays by Luvell Anderson, Claire Horisk, and Lori Watson. The legal concept of discrimination, the sneaky communicative functioning of joke-telling, and the phenomenon of hepeating are each discussed.

Rather than as a giving of permission to someone to transgress one’s bodily boundaries, I argue for defining sexual consent as feeling-with one’s sexual partner. Dominant approaches to consent within feminist philosophy have failed to capture the intercorporeal character of erotic consciousness by treating it as a form of giving permission, as is evident in the debate between attitudinal and performative theories of consent. Building on the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ann Cahill, Linda Martín Alcoff, and others, I argue that (...) taking consent to be an intercorporeal and dynamic coexistence of desiring bodies opens up new ways of thinking about the role of consent in sexual ethics. I suggest that phenomenology’s theories of embodied consciousness, operative intentionality, and the direct perception of others provide a better groundwork for conceptualizing the role of ambiguity and subtle power dynamics in sexual encounters than attitudinal or performative accounts of consent. I also defend my view against Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa’s argument for doing away with the concept of consent in sexual ethics due to consent's stubborn and infelicitous presupposition of permission-giving. (shrink)

Am 4. November 1915 legte EINSTEIN seine beriihmte Arbeit "Zur allgemeinen Relativitatstheorie" der PreuBischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin vor. 50 Jahre spater organisierte die Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften im Andenken daran eine dreitagige Konferenz, in deren Verlauf auch eine Gedenkfeier abgehalten wurde. Ich hatte die Ehre, eine Gedenkrede iiber EINSTEIN und sein Werk zu halten. In der Zwischenzeit wurde unser Wissen urn viele wichtige neue Zusatze erweitert. Wir sehen nun, daB die Dynamik der Einsteinschen Theorie in einem Superraum ablauft. (...) Seine Struktur und seine Eigenschaften sind von graBter Bedeutung. Infolgedessen habe ich jenen Teil meines Berichtes von 1965, der iiber die Quantengeometrodynamik handelt, geandert und erweitert, urn vom § 12 an unser Wissen iiber den Super­ raum zusammenzufassen. Einige Teile des hier enthaltenen Materials sind schon friiher in anderer Form erschienen. Der Autor dankt fiir die Erlaubnis, dieses Material wieder ab­ drucken zu lassen, den folgenden Verlagen: Akademie-Verlag, Berlin; W. A. Benjamin, Inc., New York; Gordon and Breach, New York; und Springer-Verlag, New York und Heidelberg, sowie den Organisatoren jener Konferenzen, auf denen diese Beitrage vorgelegt wurden: Einstein-Symposium aus Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1965; International School of Non-Linear Mathematics and Physics, Miinchen, J uli 1966; Academie Internationale de Philo sophie des Sciences, Oberwolfach/Freiburg i. Br., Juli 1966; Society of Engineering Science, Raleigh, North Carolina, Oktober 1966; Colloque Internationale sur Fluides et Champ Gravitationel en Relativite Generale, Paris, J uni 1967; und Battelle Ren­ contres in Mathematics and Physics, Seattle, Juli 1967. (shrink)

Does traditional Christianity involve paradoxical doctrines, that is, doctrines that present the appearance (at least) of logical inconsistency? If so, what is the nature of these paradoxes and why do they arise? What is the relationship between "paradox" and "mystery" in theological theorizing? And what are the implications for the rationality, or otherwise, of orthodox Christian beliefs? In Paradox in Christian Theology, James Anderson argues that the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation, as derived from Scripture and formulated (...) in the ecumenical creeds, are indeed paradoxical. But this conclusion, he contends, need not imply that Christians who believe these doctrines are irrational in doing so. In support of this claim, Anderson develops and defends a model of understanding paradoxical Christian doctrines according to which the presence of such doctrines is unsurprising and adherence to paradoxical doctrines cannot be considered as a serious intellectual obstacle to belief in Christianity. The case presented in this book has significant implications for the practice of systematic theology, biblical exegesis, and Christian apologetics. (shrink)

Postmodernism, its history and cultural context -- Postmodernism and philosophy / Stuart Sim -- Postmodernism and politics / Iain Hamilton Grant -- Postmodernism and feminism / Sue Thornham -- Postmodernism and lifestyles / Nigel Watson -- Postmodernism and religion / Pamela Sue Anderson -- Postmodernism and the postcolonial world / Eleanor Byrne -- Postmodernism and science and technology / Iain Hamilton Grant -- Postmodernism and architecture / Diane Morgan -- Postmodernism and art / Colin Trodd -- Postmodernism and (...) cinema / Val Hill -- Postmodernism and television / Marc O'Day -- Postmodernism and fiction / Barry Lewis -- Postmodernism and music / Derek B. Scott -- Postmodernism and popular culture / John Storey -- Postmodernism, modernity and the tradition of dissent / Lloyd Spencer -- Names and terms. (shrink)

This essay defends the asymmetry between the badness of spontaneous and induced abortions in order to explain why anti-abortionists prioritize stopping induced abortions over preventing spontaneous abortions. Specifically, it argues (1) the distinction between killing and letting-die is of more limited use in explaining the asymmetry than has sometimes been presumed, and (2) that accounting for intentions in moral agency does not render performances morally inert. Instead, anti-abortionists adopt a pluralist, nonreductive account of moral analysis which is situated against a (...) backdrop that sees the limits of our ability to control the process of fertility as themselves valuable. Although this view is complex, the paper concludes by arguing that it has the advantage of explaining features of the anti-abortion outlook that have sometimes been overlooked. First, it accounts for why the pre-Roe regime of abortion restrictions primarily imposed penalties on doctors who induced abortions rather than the women who seek them. Second, it explains why the advent of ectogestation will not prompt anti-abortionists to compromise on ‘disconnect abortions,’ which putatively let the embryo die by extracting it from the mother’s womb. (shrink)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 RECORDER'S PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (...) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.. (shrink)

Conventional approaches to consciousness assume that our current science tells us within tolerable limits what physical nature is. Because nature so understood cannot explain consciousness as we seem to experience it ourselves, explaining consciousness becomes a problem. One solution is to rethink what consciousness is so that it becomes the sort of thing our current natural science could in principle explain. Whitehead takes the opposite approach, using the existence of consciousness as a clue to what nature must be if it (...) can generate something like consciousness. The justification for this approach can be found in Whitehead’s implicit indictment of descriptive phenomenology. According to Whitehead, the seemingly insoluble problem of explaining consciousness naturalistically is an artifact created by the assumption that consciousness faithfully samples the world, when in fact it obscures the very aspects of nature that are indispensable to understanding how anything, including consciousness itself, could emerge through a physical process. (shrink)

Terms for consciousness, used with a cognitive meaning, emerged as count nouns in the 17th century. This transformation repeats an evolution that had taken place in late antiquity, when related vocabulary, used in the sense of conscience, went from being mass nouns designating states to count nouns designating faculties possessed by every individual. The reified concept of consciousness resulted from the rejection of the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind according to which the mind is not a countable thing, but a pure (...) potentiality. This rejection was motivated by an acute sense of the mind’s fallible subjectivity. While conditioned by recent historical events, the 17th century’s pervasive sense of subjectivity also reveals a heavy debt to Hellenistic philosophy, which had been recently rediscovered. But whereas Hellenistic thought, mistrustful of theoria, only reifies conscience, early modern thinking, more mistrustful of praxis and seeking its grounding in theoria, goes a step further and reifies consciousness. Partly modeled on theological ideas, the resulting concept of consciousness is plagued by paradoxes that have becomes notorious for their intractability. But essentially the same model of consciousness underwrites contemporary theory, embroiling contemporary debates in the same controversies that dominated the 17th century. Sidestepping these difficulties by returning to the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind would be a tall order, but it is not impossible. Alfred North Whitehead's theory of consciousness offers an example. His novel theory of time enables Whitehead to rehabilitate the Aristotelian concept of passive mind in a wholly naturalistic way. (shrink)

Although Whitehead’s particular style of philosophizing--looking at traditional philosophical problems in light of recent scientific advances--was part of a trend that began with the scientific revolutions in the early 20th century and continues today, he was marginalized in 20th century philosophy because of his outspoken defense of what he was doing as “metaphysics.” Metaphysics, for Whitehead, is a cross-disciplinary hermeneutic responsible for coherently integrating the perspectives of the special sciences with one another and with everyday experience. The program of such (...) a meta-discipline is challenging to philosophical orthodoxy because it enlarges, rather than narrows, the range of empirical evidence that philosophy must acknowledge. This places Whitehead’s philosophy in a perennial tradition that seeks to resolve fundamental antinomies through synthesis and reconciliation rather than reduction or elimination. (shrink)

Major schools of thought in the 20th century agreed in repudiating metaphysical speculation, but the agreement was superficial, for what they repudiated as “metaphysical” was often one another. Whitehead’s defense of speculative philosophy as “productive of important knowledge” singled him out for scorn from all sides at the same time that it enabled him to move beyond dogmatic standoffs . Employing the same method of speculative generalization that led to the most celebrated theoretical discoveries of the 20th century, quantum theory (...) and special relativity, Whitehead sought to resolve the conflict between objectifying, causal explanations of the world and its inhabitants and the “folk” attitudes defended and elaborated by humanistic psychologies and philosophies. The result was his theory of the “dipolar actual occasion” as the fundamental unit of existence. Recent work by leading scientists continues this effort to elaborate a nonreductive monism that accounts for both meaning and causation. (shrink)

The authors argue that the consciousness debate inhabits the same problem space today as it did in the 17th century. They attribute the lack of progress to a mindset still polarized by Descartes’ real distinction between mind and body, resulting in a standoff between humanistic and scientistic approaches. They suggest that consciousness can be adequately studied only by a multiplicity of disciplines so that the paramount problem is how to integrate diverse disciplinary perspectives into a coherent metatheory. Process philosophy is (...) well qualified to attempt such a synthesis. The rationale for the volume is summed up in the book's unifying thesis: normal, focal-attentive consciousness is not the sui generis phenomenon it is usually taken to be, but part of a wider spectrum of experience (including marginal, deviant, and non-human experience) that can only be studied by approaches as diverse as phenomenology, psycho- and neuropathology, biology, and zoology. (shrink)

In the vast literature on architectural theory and practice, the ways in which architectural knowledge is actually taught, debated, and understood are too often ignored. The essays collected in this groundbreaking volume address the current state of architecture as an academic and professional discipline. The issues considered range from the form and content of architectural education to the architect's social and environmental obligations and the emergence of a new generation of architects. Often critical of the current paradigm, these essays offer (...) a provocative challenge to accepted assumptions about the production, dissemination, and reception of architectural knowledge. Contributors: Sherry Ahrentzen, U of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Stanford Anderson, MIT; Carol Burns, Harvard U; Russell Ellis, UC Berkeley; Thomas Fisher, U of Minnesota; Linda Groat, U of Michigan; Kay Bea Jones, Ohio State U; David Leatherbarrow, U of Pennsylvania; A. G. Krishna Menon, TVB School of Habitat Studies, India; Garth Rockcastle, U of Minnesota; Michael Stanton, American U, Beirut; Sharon E. Sutton, U of Washington; David J. T. Vanderburgh, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium; and Donald Watson, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. (shrink)

This book is a treatise on time and on background independence in physics. It first considers how time is conceived of in each accepted paradigm of physics: Newtonian, special relativity, quantum mechanics (QM) and general relativity (GR). Substantial differences are moreover uncovered between what is meant by time in QM and in GR. These differences jointly source the Problem of Time: Nine interlinked facets which arise upon attempting concurrent treatment of the QM and GR paradigms, as is required in particular (...) for a background independent theory of quantum gravity. A sizeable proportion of current quantum gravity programs - e.g. geometrodynamical and loop quantum gravity approaches to quantum GR, quantum cosmology, supergravity and M-theory - are background independent in this sense. This book's foundational topic is thus furthermore of practical relevance in the ongoing development of quantum gravity programs. This book shows moreover that eight of the nine facets of the Problem of Time already occur upon entertaining background independence in classical (rather than quantum) physics. By this development, and interpreting shape theory as modelling background independence, this book further establishes background independence as a field of study. Background independent mechanics, as well as minisuperspace (spatially homogeneous) models of GR and perturbations thereabout are used to illustrate these points. As hitherto formulated, the different facets of the Problem of Time greatly interfere with each others' attempted resolutions. This book explains how, none the less, a local resolution of the Problem of Time can be arrived at after various reconceptualizations of the facets and reformulations of their mathematical implementation. Self-contained appendices on mathematical methods for basic and foundational quantum gravity are included. Finally, this book outlines how supergravity is refreshingly different from GR as a realization of background independence, and what background independence entails at the topological level and beyond. (shrink)

Chemical visualizations and models are special kinds of situated, inductive arguments. In this paper, I examine several historical case studies—an archive of images from museums, special collections, and popular magazines—as examples of emergent practices of physical modeling as theoretical play which became the basis for molecular biology and structural chemistry. Specifically, I trace a legacy of visualization tools that starts with Archibald Scott Cooper and Friedrich Kekulé in the late 1800s, crystallizes as material manipulatives in Kekulé’s student Jacobus Henricus (...) Van’t Hoff and his folded paper “toys,” is legitimized in the California lab of Linus Pauling, and is glorified in the popular imaginary with James Watson and Francis Crick’s model of DNA. My tracing then follows several threads into contemporary modeling practices. I ultimately argue that modeling play, originally outside of the boundary of deductive, positivist science, is now an accepted mode of inductive reasoning in these related chemical fields. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with the problem of freedom and determinism differ strikingly over the analysis of the concept of human freedom of the will. Compatibilists and incompatibilists, determinists and indeterminists populate the conceptual landscape with a dizzying array of theories differing in complex and subtle ways. Each of these analyses faces an under-appreciated potential challenge: the challenge from scientific essentialism. Might all traditional analyses of freedom of the will be radically ill-conceived because the concept—the nature of freedom itself—is something discoverable only (...) by empirical science? I explore this vexing question. (shrink)

This paper presents and examines the argument from divine hiddenness as an evidential argument. It argues that a key thought that motivates the argument, namely, that it's surprising that God's existence is not more obvious, does not alone secure the conclusion that divine hiddenness is evidence against God. The evidential problem of divine hiddenness is illustrated using Bayesian models.

I examine five concerns held by the general population regarding human cloning and argue that they show either a misunderstanding about the process and/or result of cloning, or else ignorance about what we already do. Put differently, I argue that human cloning is not in principle more questionable than other current practices. However, I do have serious concerns about the uses to which the new technology will be put. I argue that the reasons currently proposed for human cloning are not (...) persuasive. My position is that human cloning is not objectionable in principle, but practical application of the technology raises serious concerns. In my opinion, present circumstances do not seem to warrant it. (shrink)

Pamela conceived of vulnerability as a capability to enhance our lives in a continual creative process of transformation. She argued for recreating our perception of vulnerability as positive in our lives and in our relationships. I come to this exploration of transformation both as an academic and as Pamela’s sister, exploring my own lived experience of vulnerability and love as a result of her passing, and seeking to understand how her concept of creative transformation can relate to my personal experiences (...) as well as others’ stories of transformation. Pamela describes that an openness to vulnerability creates a space or a threshold for transformation. This space can be dark and disorienting yet as we move through it we have the freedom to make choices that enhance our personal lives as well as the social and political contexts within which we live and work. In my work that encourages a holistic mind–body–spirit view of health and healing I can see how Pamela’s conception of vulnerability as a capability opens us to a creative response for healing. My exploration of vulnerability and creative transformation reveals that Pamela’s work on vulnerability can be applied to creative transformation broadly and is especially relevant in a world currently torn apart by violence and fear. An openness to vulnerability may help the world to evolve toward love and hope. (shrink)

A reflexão tem como objetivo identificar aspectos de um pensamento educacional no conjunto das obras, em Nietzsche, como uma perspectiva de autotransformação. Defende a tese de que a perspectiva educacional do filósofo é crítica e se apresenta como uma antieducação, na medida em que se contrapõe ao modelo educativo tradicional. Tendo como procedimento metodológico a pesquisa bibliográfica, recorreu-se à seleção de textos e obras que abordaram a temática da Educação nas três fases do pensamento de Nietzsche. Na primeira fase, consideram-se (...) os textos: “Sobre o futuro dos nossos estabelecimentos de ensino” e a “Terceira Consideração extemporânea: Schopenhauer como educador”. Neles, identificam-se aspectos de um projeto educativo em devir na filosofia de Nietzsche, voltado à renovação da cultura alemã daquela época. Já na segunda fase, trata-se da ruptura com a filosofia de Schopenhauer, e com a música de Richard Wagner como aspectos fundamentais de um projeto educacional que passou a inaugurar a “Escola da Suspeita” na obra Humano, demasiado humano, que leva Nietzsche a pensar na ciência como um contraponto à forma metafísica de entender o mundo. Ele dá preferência às coisas demasiadamente humanas, ou seja, pensa na Educação como libertação, na perspectiva do espírito livre. Em decorrência do pensamento educacional de Nietzsche, em sua terceira fase na obra Assim falou Zaratustra, identificam-se quatro aspectos da antieducação traduzidos como: o ensino da solidão; o ensino da elevação; o ensino da grande razão; e o ensino da afirmação. Conclui-se que tais aspectos constituem um quadro interpretativo, os quais articulam as lições filosófico-existenciais de uma Pedagogia Crítica na Educação, contrária à tradição ocidental que construiu, em seus processos educativos, uma cultura da gregariedade e da negação da vida. (shrink)

In 1958 William L. Langer, in a well-known presidential address to the American Historical Association, declared the informed use of psychoanalytic depth psychology as "the next assignment" for professional historians. _Psychoanalysis and History_, volume 31 of _The Annual of Psychoanalysis_, examines the degree to which Langer's directive has been realized in the intervening 45 years. Section I makes the case for psychobiography in the lives of historical figures and exemplifies this perspective with analytically informed studies of the art of Wassily (...) Kandinsky; the films of Stanley Kubrick; and the anti-Semitism of Adolf Hitler. Section II reviews Freud's own psychohistorical contributions and then considers the relevance to historical inquiry of the more recent perspectives of Winnicott, Kernberg, and Kohut. Section III explores an intriguing tributary of psychobiographical inquiry: the impact of the biographer's own subjectivity on his or her work. Section IV turns to a topic of perennial interest: the psychobiographical study of American presidents. Section V turns to the special challenges of applying psychoanalysis to topics of religious history and includes topical studies of religious figures as disparate as the 15th century Asian Drukpa Kunley and Osama bin Laden. Section VI focuses on the recent extension of psychohistorical inquiry to groups of people and to cultural phenomena more generally: an investigation of the youth movement in pre-Nazi Germany; consideration of how societies, no less than individuals, reenact and work through traumas over time; and an outline of the role of analysis in constructing a depth-psychological "social psychology" of use to historians. These papers, no less than those that precede them, are compelling testimony to the claim with which editors James William Anderson and Jerome A. Winer begin the volume, to wit, that "Psychoanalysis would seem to be a resource indispensable to the study of history.". (shrink)

The trouble with business schools -- The great, but delicate experiment -- A hippocratic oath for business -- Six more arguments for the MBA oath -- The purpose of a manager -- Ethics and integrity -- No man is an island : stakeholders -- Ambition and good faith -- The letter and the spirit : law -- The sunlight of responsibility : transparency -- Personal and professional growth -- Sustainable prosperity : a partnership for living well -- Accountability.

In barely the space of one generation, Athens was transformed from a conventional city-state into something completely new--a region-state on a scale previously unthinkable. This book sets out to answer a seemingly simple question: How and when did the Athenian state attain the anomalous size that gave it such influence in Greek politics and culture in the classical period? Many scholars argue that Athens's incorporation of Attica was a gradual development, largely completed some two hundred years before the classical era. (...) Anderson, however, suggests that it is not until the late sixth century that we see the first systematic attempts by the Athenian polis to integrate all of Attica. Anderson first takes issue with the prevailing view of Cleisthenes' landmark political reforms of 508-7 b.c., arguing that they were animated by a more comprehensive vision of regional political community in Attica. The Athenians' strengthened the state by establishing institutional mechanisms that would allow inhabitants of the Attic periphery to participate as never before in the life of the center. The creation of a suitable physical setting for the new order was accompanied by religious, military, and symbolic innovations. Regional participation in Athenian affairs was stimulated by encouraging the Attic populace to imagine themselves, for the first time ever, as members of a single, like-minded, self-governing political community. Greg Anderson is Assistant Professor of Classics and History, University of Illinois at Chicago. (shrink)

This pioneering anthology of Middle English prologues and other excerpts from texts written between 1280 and 1520 is one of the largest collections of vernacular literary theory from the Middle Ages yet published and the first to focus attention on English literary theory before the sixteenth century. It edits, introduces, and glosses some sixty excerpts, all of which reflect on the problems and opportunities associated with writing in the "mother tongue" during a period of revolutionary change for the English language. (...) The excerpts fall into three groups, illustrating the strategies used by medieval writers to establish their cultural authority, the ways they constructed audiences and readerships, and the models they offered for the process of reading. Taken together, the excerpts show how vernacular texts reflected and contributed to the formation of class, gender, professional, and national identity. They open windows onto late medieval debates on women's and popular literacy, on the use of the vernacular for religious instruction or Bible translation, on the complex metaphorical associations contained within the idea of the vernacular, and on the cultural and political role of the "courtly" writing associated with Chaucer and his successors. Besides the excerpts, the book contains five essays that propose new definitions of medieval literary theory, discuss the politics of Middle English writing, the relation of medieval book production to notions of authorship, and the status of the prologue as a genre, and compare the role of the medieval vernacular to that of postcolonial literatures. The book includes a substantial glossary that constitutes the first mapping of the language and terms of Middle English literary theory. _The Idea of the Vernacular_ will be an invaluable asset not only to Middle English survey courses but to courses in English literary and cultural history and courses on the history of literary theory. (shrink)

We encounter offense through various media: an intended facetious remark, a protester’s photographic image of an aborted fetus, an epithet, a stereotypical joke of a minority racial group. People say things that cause offense all of the time. And causing offense can have serious consequences, both personal and professional; the offending party is subject to termination, suspension, or social isolation and public opprobrium. Since the stakes are so high we should have a better understanding of the mechanisms of offense involved (...) in these media and how they work. In this dissertation I focus on two mechanisms for communicating offense—i.e. racial and ethnic slurs and racial humor. First, I lay out a few distinctions concerning the particular kind of offense being targeted, objective versus subjective offense, and when state involvement might be appropriate for penalizing offensive behavior. Next, I discuss racial slurs and the conditions of their offensiveness. I offer a non-content based view of slurs’ offense, which contradicts the consensus view held by most philosophers of language and linguists working on this issue. Also, I look more closely at a purportedly non-offensive use of slurring language, so-called linguistic appropriation, and determine that appropriated uses are permissible in certain settings only under certain conditions. And finally, I propose a tri-partite analysis of racial jokes that provides conditions for when they are merely racial, racially insensitive, or racist. (shrink)